And when we speak of “abandonment” � a favorite word of Heidegger � we only mean to say that God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequences of his absence right to the end. The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain type of secular moralism which seeks to suppress God at the least possible expense. Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavoured to formulate a secular morality, they said something like this: God is a useless and costly hypothesis, so we will do without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them. It must be considered obligatory a priori to be honest, not to lie, not to beat one’s wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do a little work on this subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all the same, inscribed in an intelligible heaven although, of course, there is no God. In other words � and this is, I believe, the purport意义, 大要, 要旨of all that we in France call radicalism � nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall rediscover the same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of God as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself.
当我们讲到孤独（abandonment）的时候――海德格所喜欢用的一个名词――我们只是说上帝不存在，我们必须自始至终地面对它不存在一切后果。存在主义是极端反对那种以最低的代价去废弃上帝的俗世道德论的。约在一八八○年时，一些法国的哲学教授们企图建立一种俗世道德论，他们这样地说：“上帝是一个代价高但却无用的假设，所以，我们废弃他。”然而，假如我们要有道德、一个社会以及法治的世界，那么最基本的是要严肃地承认某些价值。它们必须要有一种属于它们的先验的存在。例如，诚实，不说谎，不打妻子，抚育子女等被视为先验的责任，所以我们要在这个题目上略为研讨，以证明纵然上帝不存在，一切道德价值仍然同样地存在着，仍然是附属于一个睿智的天国上。换言之――这就是我们在法国所称的急进主义的旨趣――假如上帝不存在，一切都不会改变；我们将重新发现同样的诚实，进步和仁爱，同时，我们将认为上帝是一种过时的假设，它本身会默然而逝的。
The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote: “If God did not exist, everything would be permitted”; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn孤独的, 凄凉的, 悲惨的, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith立刻, 不延迟地, 不犹豫地, that he is without excuse.
相反地，存在主义者发现假如上帝不存在，则情形将是很难堪的，因为一切从睿智的天国发现价值的可能性将随之消逝。既然没有无限完美的意识加以思考，那么先验的事物将不再有什么用处。没有地方写着：“善良”存在，我们必须诚实，或者不得说谎，因为我们身处于只有人生存着的土地上。陀斯妥也夫斯基曾写道：“如果上帝不曾存在，任何事情都可被允许的。”而这正是存在主义的出发点。假如上帝不存在，任何事情确实都可被允许的，结果人就孤立无依了。因为他无法在他自身之内和自身之外发现可以依赖的东西。他随着发现，他是无理由可解释的。
For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism � man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. � We are left alone, without excuse.
因为如果存在确是先于本质，我们就永远不能根据天赋和特殊的人性去解释自己的行为；换言之，就没有什么决定论――人是自由的，人就是自由。另一方面，假如上帝不存在，也就没有任何价值或命令给予我们以规范我们的行为。因此，在我们的后面和前面都没有一个光辉的价值领域，都没有任何理由或借口。我们孑然孤立，没有任何理由可寻。
That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand passion as a destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion.
这就是我所谓的人是被注定为自由的意义。说是被注定，乃由于人并不会创造自己，然而又是自由的，自从人被抛进这个世界，他就要对他所做的任何事情负责。存在主义者不相信热情的力量。他不同意巨大的热情是决定性的引导人们于行动的一道破坏性急流，因而就可以把它作为人的一种托词。他认为一个人对于自己的热情也应该负责。
Neither will an existentialist think that a man can find help through some sign being vouchsafed赐予, 允许 upon earth for his orientation: for he thinks that the man himself interprets the sign as he chooses. He thinks that every man, without any support or help whatever, is condemned at every instant to invent man. As Ponge has written in a very fine article, “Man is the future of man.” That is exactly true. Only, if one took this to mean that the future is laid up in Heaven, that God knows what it is, it would be false, for then it would no longer even be a future. If, however, it means that, whatever man may now appear to be, there is a future to be fashioned, a virgin future that awaits him � then it is a true saying. But in the present one is forsaken.
存在主义者不认为一个人可以借发现什么预兆，去帮助他决定未来行动的方向。因为他认为一个人在选择的时候，就自行解释了这预兆。所以他认为每一个人，无须任何的支持或援助，人，是时时刻刻都注定要去创造自己的。庞其（ponge）在一篇非常精辟的论文中说过：“人就是人的未来。”这话对极了。但是，若把这话中的将来，了解为存在于天堂中的将来，上帝会知道它是什么，那就错了，因为那样就没有将来可言了。如果把这话中的将来，了解为无论人现在怎么样，永远有一个未来等待着他去塑造，一个等待着他而未经开辟的未来，那就对了。但是现在，人们是被孤独的。
As an example by which you may better understand this state of abandonment, I will refer to the case of a pupil of mine, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarrelling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her only consolation was in this young man.
为了使你们更明白这种孤独的状况，我想举出我的一个学生的情形为例，这学生要我在下述的情景中替他找出解决的办法。他的父亲正和他的母亲吵架，而且还有“通敌”的倾向。他的哥哥在一九四○年德军侵袭时被杀，而这个青年人，怀着原始而激昂的心情，燃烧着复仇的愿望。他母亲和他单独住在一起，深为他父亲叛国的行为和长子的死亡而悲痛。她把唯一的安慰便是这个年轻人。
But he, at this moment, had the choice between going to England to join the Free French Forces or of staying near his mother and helping her to live. He fully realised that this woman lived only for him and that his disappearance � or perhaps his death � would plunge her into despair. He also realised that, concretely and in fact, every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would be sure of effect in the sense of aiding her to live, whereas anything he did in order to go and fight would be an ambiguous action which might vanish like water into sand and serve no purpose. For instance, to set out for England he would have to wait indefinitely in a Spanish camp on the way through Spain; or,百家乐, on arriving in England or in Algiers he might be put into an office to fill up forms. Consequently, he found himself confronted by two very different modes of action; the one concrete, immediate, but directed towards only one individual; and the other an action addressed to an end infinitely greater, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous � and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, he was hesitating between two kinds of morality; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. He had to choose between those two.
但是这个年轻人这时却处于两种选择之间――到英国加入自由法军，或留在母亲身边帮助她生活。他十分清楚他母亲是为着他而活，他的消失――可能是死亡――会使她陷入绝望之中。同时他具体而真实地感觉到，他为他母亲所做的任何行为，将会产生有助于她生存下去的确实的效果。然而他为战争所做的任何事情，则有可能如水之渗入沙中，毫无作用。例如，要到英国去，则经过西班牙时，他必须在西班牙的营中待一段不能确定的时间，在到达英国或者阿尔及尔时，他可能会被安排做一些案头工作。结果，他发觉到他自己遭遇着两种完全不同的行动方式：一种具体而直接，但只为了一个人；另一种则为了一个无限大的目标――国家的集体――但也因此而模糊不清，而且可能中途受阻。同时，他也犹豫于两种道德之间，一方面是同情个人情感的道德；另一方面则是范围广泛而真实性值得怀疑的道德。他必须在这两者中作一个选择。
What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbour, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. The Kantian ethic says, Never regard another as a means, but always as an end. Very well; if I remain with my mother, I shall be regarding her as the end and not as a means: but by the same token I am in danger of treating as means those who are fighting on my behalf; and the converse is also true, that if I go to the aid of the combatants I shall be treating them as the end at the risk of treating my mother as a means.
什么东西能帮助他来作这个选择呢？基督教的教条能够吗？不。基督教的教条说：行为要仁慈，要爱护你的邻居，要为别人牺牲自己，要选择最难走的路径，等等。但哪一条是最难走的路径呢？对于什么样的人，我们要付出更多的兄弟之爱呢？爱国人士还是母亲？哪一个是更为有用的目标：广泛地为整个社会而奋斗呢？还是帮助一个特定的人物生活下去呢？谁能够先验地对此作一个答案？没有一个人能够。这在任何伦理经典中也没有答案。康德的伦理学上说：永远不要把别人当作一个手段,百家乐开户，而应当作一个目的。不错，如果我留下来跟母亲在一起，我把她视为目的而不是手段。但是由于这个做法，我就处于视那些为我作战的人为手段的危险中，反过来看也是真的，如果我去帮助作战的人，我就视他们为目的，但却处于以我母亲为手段的危险中。
If values are uncertain, if they are still too abstract to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, nothing remains but to trust in our instincts. That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her � my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.”
如果价值是不确定的，如果它们还是太抽象而不能决定特殊的事件，或者在考虑之中的具体事件，那我们除了信任我们的直觉之外就别无所遗了。这就是这青年所面临的；当我看到他时，他说：“最后，只有依赖感觉了。真正推动我的方向就是我要选择的那一个。如果，我感觉我深爱我的母亲而可为她牺牲一切――我复仇的意志，我的行动与冒险的热望――那我就留下来跟她在一起。反之，如果我觉得我对母亲的爱不够深，那我就走。”
But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. I can only estimate the strength of this affection if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle.
但是，一个人如何估计感情的力量呢？他对他母亲情感的价值是由他陪伴着她这事实所真实地决定的。我可以说我爱护某一个朋友到可以为他牺牲某种数目的金钱，但除非我已经这样做了，否则我无法证明。如果我真的留下来了，我可以说：“我对我母亲的爱足以使我留下来。”我只能以我是否实行了明确的被认可的行为来测量我的情感力量。但是，那时如果我依赖这种情感来判断我的行为，我就觉得我自己陷进了一个恶性循环。
Moreover, as Gide has very well said, a sentiment which is play-acting and one which is vital are two things that are hardly distinguishable one from another. To decide that I love my mother by staying beside her, and to play a comedy the upshot of which is that I do so � these are nearly the same thing. In other words, feeling is formed by the deeds that one does; therefore I cannot consult it as a guide to action. And that is to say that I can neither seek within myself for an authentic impulse to action, nor can I expect, from some ethic, formulae that will enable me to act. You may say that the youth did, at least, go to a professor to ask for advice. But if you seek counsel � from a priest, for example, you have selected that priest; and at bottom you already knew, more or less, what he would advise. In other words, to choose an adviser is nevertheless to commit oneself by that choice. If you are a Christian, you will say, consult a priest; but there are collaborationists, priests who are resisters and priests who wait for the tide to turn: which will you choose? Had this young man chosen a priest of the resistance, or one of the collaboration, he would have decided beforehand the kind of advice he was to receive. Similarly, in coming to me, he knew what advice I should give him, and I had but one reply to make. You are free, therefore choose, that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do: no signs are vouchsafed in this world. The Catholics will reply, “Oh, but they are!” Very well; still, it is I myself, in every case, who have to interpret the signs.
而且，纪德说得好,新2网址，逢场作戏的情感和认真的情感是两种几乎不能区别的东西。决定留在母亲身边表示我对我母亲的爱和演一幕喜剧，而其结果同样也是留在她身边，―― 这两件事情几乎是一样的。换句话说，感情是由我们所做的行为而形成的。因此，我不能把它当作行为的指导而求教于它,太阳城开户。这也就是说我既不能从我的自身找出行动的真正的冲动，也不能期望从伦理学中找到它。你可以说这个青年人的确至少是到教授那里去征求过意见。但是，举一个例说，假使你去一位牧师那里征求意见，那就是你已经选择了这个牧师。至少你已经或多或少知道了他会给你什么样的劝告。换句话说，选择一个劝告者仍然是自我选择。如果你是一个基督教徒,博彩网站，你会说：去问牧师，但牧师中有抵抗派，有通敌派，还有骑墙派，你要选择哪一类的呢？假使这青年人选择了抵抗派或通敌派的牧师，他必已事先决定了他将获得的建议。同样地，他来找我，也已晓得我会给他什么样的意见，而我只能给他一个答复，你是自由的，因此选择罢――这就是说，创造。在一般的道德中，没有任何规则可以告诉你必须做什么；在这世界上也没有什么预兆。天主教徒会回答说：“啊！但它们是预兆啊！”很好，可是无论如何仍然是我自己必须解释这些事情。
While I was imprisoned, I made the acquaintance of a somewhat remarkable man, a Jesuit, who had become a member of that order in the following manner. In his life he had suffered a succession of rather severe setbacks. His father had died when he was a child, leaving him in poverty, and he had been awarded a free scholarship in a religious institution, where he had been made continually to feel that he was accepted for charity’s sake, and, in consequence, he had been denied several of those distinctions and honours which gratify children. Later, about the age of eighteen, he came to grief in a sentimental affair; and finally, at twenty-two � this was a trifle in itself, but it was the last drop that overflowed his cup � he failed in his military examination.
当我在狱中的时候，我认识了一个有点特殊的人。他是一个耶稣会的会员，他是在下述情况下成为会员的：他一生曾遭到一连串十分严重的挫折。他的父亲在他童年时去世，此后他就陷入了穷困之中，有个教会学校曾赠给他一个免费的学籍，在学校里他一直以为是因为受了怜悯而被收容的，事实上他被剥夺了几个使儿童感到愉快的名声和荣耀。后来，大约十八岁的时候，他因爱情而痛苦，最后在二十岁的时候――本来是非常微小的事，但这已经是他生命的杯子中流出的最后的一滴了――他军事考试失败了。
This young man, then, could regard himself as a total failure: it was a sign � but a sign of what? He might have taken refuge in bitterness or despair. But he took it � very cleverly for him � as a sign that he was not intended for secular success, and that only the attainments of religion, those of sanctity圣洁; 崇高; 虔诚; 神圣and of faith, were accessible to him. He interpreted his record as a message from God, and became a member of the Order. Who can doubt but that this decision as to the meaning of the sign was his, and his alone?
于是这年轻人大概认定自己的人生是彻底失败了。这是一个征象――但是什么征象呢？他可以在痛苦和绝望中寻找避难所。然而他很聪明，他把它当作是无法于尘世成功的征象，只有那些圣洁的、忠诚的宗教的皈依，对他而言是可以企求的。他把他的事迹解释为上帝的旨意，要他成为圣职的会员。谁能怀疑他对这征象的决定不是他自己的呢？而且只能是他的而已。
One could have drawn quite different conclusions from such a series of reverses � as, for example, that he had better become a carpenter or a revolutionary. For the decipherment of the sign, however, he bears the entire responsibility. That is what “abandonment” implies, that we ourselves decide our being. And with this abandonment goes anguish.
一个人可以由一连串的失败中引申出极不相同的结论――举例说，他最好去做一个木匠或者一个革命者。为了解释此一征象，他负有全部的责任。这就是“孤独”的意义，而烦恼就因此和孤独同在。